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Trade in Health Services and Globalization: The Role of Infinitesimal 
Changes of Trade Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract : This paper attempts to integrate the issues related to health care, 
consumption efficiency hypothesis and international trade in the context of a 
developing economy. In this article we have framed a hybrid type of three sector 
general equilibrium trade model in the presence of a nutritional efficiency factor of 
health consumption, where first two sectors form a Heckscher-Ohlin nugget and the 
third one is a non-traded health service producing sector. Overall, we find little harm 
from trade, and potential gains from welfare aspect.  
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Trade in Health Services and Globalization: The Role of Infinitesimal 
Changes of Trade Policy 
 
1. Introduction           
             
In the literature on development economics we find that one of the main causes behind 
underdevelopment of an economy is the lack of advancement of the health sector.  In 
recent years various policies regarding the health aspect are adopted by the policy 
makers of developing economies. It is a very commonly held view that poor health 
scenario of the country is due to the existence of poor infrastructural facilities in the 
economy as a whole1. It suggests that emphasis should be focused on infrastructural 
development in order to improve welfare. In the traditional literature on development 
economics, a developing economy is broadly classified into two sectors: an industrial 
sector and an export sector. But the presence of health sector along with import and 
export sectors, where the health commodity2 is a non-traded final product, the 
traditional results may change. It thus creates interest among the policy makers in the 
context of the various polices undertaken by them for a developing economy. It is to be 
noted that in this study we have confined ourselves with trade related policies, for 
1 National Health Accounts (NHA) has Shown that in India public health expenditure as a share of GDP 
increased from 0.96 per cent in 2004-05 to just 1.01 per cent in 2008-09 as compared to 5 per cent for 
developed economies. The public health sector is characterized by economically inefficient along with 
poor physical infrastructure. The mismatch between demand and supply of healthcare services and 
infrastructure has triggered the emergence of private participation in the Indian health sector through 
FDI. Thus it is become crucial to us to examine the impact of FDI in the health sector. 
 
2 In a developing economy most of the health commodities are non-traded final commodities such as 
different types of hospital facilities as well as health facilities like availability of medicines, health check-
up facilities etc.       
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instances foreign capital inflow to health sector3 or in general, inflow of foreign capital 
and presence of import tariff etc.        
In order to examine the impact of foreign health capital inflow in a developing economy 
we must start from the impact of foreign capital inflow in a developing economy. In fact 
health capital can also be in the form of foreign health capital. At the outset we start 
from the literature on the impact of foreign capital inflow4 in a developing economy. It 
starts with the famous Brecher-Alejandro (1977) proposition which states that an inflow 
of foreign capital in a two-commodity, two factor full employment model with full 
repatriation of its earnings reduces social welfare if the import-competing sector is 
capital intensive and is protected by a tariff. However, in the absence of any tariff, the 
inflow of foreign capital with full repatriation of its earnings does not affect social 
welfare.      
 
The main motivation behind this study generates from the fact that only a few empirical 
works deal with the issue of foreign health capital and welfare. In fact at the theoretical 
level almost no work in a general equilibrium structure has been done to examine the 
impact of foreign health capital inflow on welfare. The present study attempts to 
examine the impact of foreign (health) capital inflow on welfare in terms of a three-
3 Funds such as ICICI Ventures, IFC, Ashmore and Apax Partners invested about US$ 450 million in the 
first six months of 2008-2009 compared to US$ 125 million during the same period of the previous year. 
Feedback Ventures expects private equity funds to invest at least US$ 1 billion during 2009-2013. 12 
percent of the US$ 77 million venture capital investments in July-September 2009 were in the healthcare 
sector. GE plans to invest over US$ 3 billion on R&D, US$ 2 billion to drive healthcare information 
technology and health in rural and underserved areas, US$ 1 billion in partnerships, content and services, 
over the next six years. International clinic chain Asklepios International plans to invest US$ 100 -200 
million in the Indian healthcare market. Gulf-based group Dr Moopen is planning to invest US$ 200 
million for setting up hospitals and eye-care centres across India. Fortis is planning to invest US$ 55 
million to expand its pan-India operations. 
 
4 Foreign capital inflow also refers to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
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sector general equilibrium model and hence attempts to fill up the lacuna in this line of 
work. Moreover most of the works in trade literature that deal with health aspect have 
immensely ignored the role of export sector as well as import sector (other than health 
sector) of a developing economy. In this study we are trying to fill up this gap also.  
 
The present model is an extension of Beladi-Marjit(1992) as in this model a third sector, 
a non-traded health sector, has been introduced5. It attempts to examine the effects of 
liberalization in the form of foreign health capital inflow on the price of health 
commodity, returns to the various inputs and on welfare in a developing economy. 
Though Chaudhuri(2007) has considered the impact of foreign capital inflow in the 
presence of non-traded agricultural final commodity in a general equilibrium structure, 
our analysis is quite different because we assume health commodity as a non-traded 
final good and foreign health capital is specific to that sector.   
 
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 considers the basic model. 
The analysis related to the drive towards trade liberalization is explained in section 3.  
The price effect of trade liberalization and output effect of trade liberalization have 
considered in subsection 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. Section 4 the impact of trade 
liberalization on social welfare. Finally, the concluding remarks are made in section 5. 
          
2.  The Basic Model          
 
We consider a small open economy consisting of three sectors in a Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson framework. Out of the three sectors, one is an export sector(A), which 
produces its output using labour(L) and capital(K), the second sector is a import 
5 In the three-sector models on foreign capital and welfare the third sector may either be an export 
processing zone as in the work of Beladi-Marjit(1992) or it may be the urban informal sector as in the 
works of Grinols(1991), Gupta(1997) etc or it may be intermediate goods producing sector as in the works 
of Marjit and Beladi(1997) and Marjit, Broll and Mitra (1997).  
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sector(M), which produces output by using labour and capital. This second sector is the 
import competing sector while the first sector, that is, sector A, is the export sector of 
the economy. Sector M is protected by tariff(t). Here K consists of domestic capital (KD) 
and foreign capital(KF) and we assume that KD and KF are perfect substitutes. K is 
perfectly mobile between sectors A and M. The third sector is the health sector. Health 
capital (N) has been considered as specific to the health sector(H). This sector also uses 
the labour input(L) to produce a non-traded final health commodity. All these three 
sectors6 use labour which is perfectly mobile among them. Health capital consists of 
both domestic health capital(ND) and foreign health capital(NF), and we assume ND and 
NF are perfect substitutes.    
 
Here sector A produces its output XA, sectors M and H produce output XM and XH 
respectively. We assume that the export sector is more labour-intensive compared to the 
import sector. The export product is considered as the numeraire its price is set equal to 
unity. We assume that both foreign capital income and foreign health capital income are 
fully repatriated. Production functions of each sector exhibit constant returns to scale 
with diminishing marginal productivity for each factor. The following notations are 
used in this model.  
 
Xi = product produced by the ith sector, i = A,M,H; P*A = world price of commodity A; 
PA = domestic price of commodity A, we assume PA = P*A = 1; P*M = world price of good 
M; PM =  P*M(1+ t) = domestic price of good M; PH = domestically determined price of 
good H; L  = fixed number of workers in the economy; ND = domestic health capital 
stock of the economy; NF = foreign health capital stock of the economy; N  = economy ,s 
aggregate health capital stock (N = ND + NF); KF = foreign capital stock; KD = domestic 
capital stock; K = economy,s aggregate capital stock (K = KD + KF);  aji = quantity of the 
jth factor for producing one unit of output in the ith sector, j=L,K,N and i =A,M,H;  θji  = 
6 All the three sectors produce final commodities in this model. 
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distributive share of the jth input in the ith sector;  λji = proportion of the jth factor used 
in the production of the ith sector;  t  = ad-valorem rate of tariff on the import of 
commodity M; W = competitive wage rate; r  = rate of return to capital, R = rate of 
return to health capital; Di = consumption demand for the ith final commodity, i = 
A,M,H; EHPH =own price elasticity of demand for commodity H; EHY = income elasticity 
of demand for commodity H; U = social utility; Y = national income at domestic price; 
mM = marginal propensity to consume for commodity M; I  = import demand for 
commodity M; σi = elasticity of factor substitution in sector I, i = A, M, H; ^ = 
proportional change    
The equational structure of the model is as follows.      
The competitive equilibrium conditions in the product market for the three sectors give 
us the following equations.        
aLAW +aKAr =1              (1)  
aLMW + aKMr = PM*(1+t)             (2) 
aLHW + aNHR = PH                         (3) 
 
Sector specificity of health capital is given by the following equation     
aNHXH = ND +NF =N                        
(4)  
 
Perfect mobility of capital between sectors A and M can be expressed as   
aKAXA + aKMXM = KD+ KF =K            (5)  
 
Here we assume that the output of the health sector has some effects on labour 
endowment. This effect can be analyzed by the introduction of nutritional efficiency 
factor (e) in our basic model. In this model nutritional efficiency function can be written 
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as e = e(XH),given that, e/>0 and εe >0, where εe is the elasticity of nutritional efficiency 
function. The rational is that as output of the health sector increases, better 
hospitalization facilities etc are available to the workers which improves their level of 
nutritional efficiency. 
Full employment of labour implies the following equation     
aLAXA + aLMXM + aLHXH = e(XH)L             (6)  
 
The demand for the non-traded final commodity is given by     
DH = DH(PH ,PM ,Y )                         (7) 
 
We assume that commodity H is a normal good with negative and positive own price 
elasticity and income elasticities of demand, respectively, that is ,EHPH<0 and EHY>0. 
The cross price elasticity is positive, that is, EHPM>0 .      
 
The demand –supply equality condition for commodity H is      
DH (PH ,PM ,Y) = XH                         (8)  
 
The demand for commodity M and the volume of import are given by the following 
equations respectively.          
  
DM =DM (PH ,PM ,Y)                     (9)  
I = DM (PH ,PM ,Y) - XM                      (10)  
 
The national income of the economy at domestic prices is given by    
Y = XA + PMXM + PHXH – rKF –RNF +tPM*I                         
(11.1)   
or             
Y = We(XH)L + RND + rKD + tPM*I                (11.2). 
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The working of the model is as follows. There are eleven endogenous variables in the 
system: W, r, R, PH, XA, XM, XH, DM, DH, I and Y. Here we have eleven independent 
equations(equations (1) to(11) ) to solve for eleven unknowns. We can find out the value 
of W and r from equations (1) and (2). From equation (3) we can express R as a function 
of PH. Thus it is an indecomposable structure7. Hence from equation (4) aNH can be 
expressed as a function of PH. For given N ,XH can be expressed as a function of PH also. 
So, from equations (5) and (6) XA and XM are expressed in terms of PH. From equation 
(11.2) we can express Y as a function of PH. So equation (7) is expressed as a function of 
PH. To complete the working the model we have to consider the following lemmas.  
Lemma 1: An increase in the price level of the non-traded heath services, HP , has a negative 
effect on the demand of output level of the corresponding health care if 
λλθ /)/(/ ** QXtPPDPtPRN KAMPMHMHPMNHD −<∂∂+ , 
H
PH
H
Y EVYBE >/7  and 0ˆˆ == FF KN .   
Proof of Lemma 1: Simply by differentiation of equation (8) we can derive (see 
Appendix A for detail derivation) 
=
DDH
H
dD
dP
0)/( 7 <+
H
PH
H
YH EBEVYP  
Lemma 2: An increase in the price level of the non-traded heath services, HP , has a positive effect 
on the supply of output level of the corresponding health care if 0ˆˆ == FF KN .   
Proof of Lemma 2: Simply by differentiation of equation (8) we can derive (see 
Appendix A for detail derivation) 
=
SSH
H
dX
dP 0)/( >HHLHNHH XP σθθ  
Thus equation (8), lemma 1 and lemma 2 help us to determine the value of PH. 
[Figure -1 here] 
7 If the factor prices are determined independently of factor endowments we refer to the structure as a 
decomposable structure. 
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Once PH is known XA, XM, Y and XH are also known. Thus equations (7) and (9) help us 
to determine the values of DH and DM respectively. Finally using equation (10) we get 
the value of I.   
 
The demand side of the model is represented by a social utility function. Let U be the 
social utility function and it is shown as,       
U = U (DA, DM, DH)           (12)  
With UA >0, UM > 0, UH >0, UAA<0, UMM < 0, UHH<0       
 
The balance of trade equilibrium requires that       
DA +PMDM +PHDH = XA +PMXM +PHXH –rKF –RNF +tPM*I      (13)  
 
Note sector H is a non-traded final good producing sector and its price is determined 
endogenously from the system.  
 
3. Drive towards Trade Liberalization in the presence of a Health Care 
3.1 Price effects of Trade Liberalization         
 
Here we want to examine the impact of an inflow of foreign capital as well as of foreign 
health capital on the level of social welfare of a developing economy. To do these at first 
we want to find out separately the impact of KF and NF on the price level of the health 
sector (PH). The return to capital (r) and the wage rate (W) are not affected through a 
change in the price of a non-traded final good, PH , but the factor price ,R ,is affected 
through a change PH. Differentiating equation (3) and by using the corollary of 
Shepherd lemma we get ,         
Rˆ = (1/𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) FNˆ                                         (3.1) 
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Using the above result and differentiating equations (4), (5) and (6)we can get8 
HXˆ = µ FNˆ  +�
𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁� HPˆ                   (4.1)  
λKA AXˆ + λKM MXˆ = γ FKˆ                    (5.1) 
 
 λLA𝑋𝑋�𝐴𝐴 + λLM𝑋𝑋�𝑀𝑀  = - [(λLH – εh)µ𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹  + Q𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁]                                                   (6.2.1)  
where, Q = [(λLH – εe)𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
σH + λLHσH] >0, and we assume  λLH > εe.  
Solving the above equations by Cramer’s rule and simplifying we get   
  𝑋𝑋�𝐴𝐴 = 
1|𝜆𝜆|[B1𝐾𝐾�𝐹𝐹 + B2𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹  + B3𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁]                    
(20)  𝑋𝑋�𝑀𝑀  = 
1|𝜆𝜆|[B4𝐾𝐾�𝐹𝐹 + B5𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹  + B6𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁]                    
(21) 
where,            
 µ = (NF /N);          
 γ = (KF /K);          
 B1 = (γλLM) >0 ;         
 B2 = [µλKM (λLH – εe )] >0;         
 B3 = (λKMQ) >0 ;         
 B4 = (-γλLA ) <0 ;         
 B5 = [-µλKA (λLH – εe )] <0 ;         
 B6 = [-λKA Q] <0 ;         
 B7 = [RND/θNH +tPM*PH(δDM/δPH) –tPM*XM 1|𝜆𝜆|B6];     
 B8 = (-tPM*XM 1|𝜆𝜆| B4 ) <0 ;         
 B9 =[ WLh/XHµ - tPM*XM 1|𝜆𝜆|A5]  <0 ;       
 B10 = [ µ -EHY (1/VY)B9] >0 ;        
B11 = [-EHY(1/VY)B8] >0 ;         
8 See Appendix A.1 for detailed derivation. 
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            B   = [EHPH +EHY(1/VY)B7 - 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁] <0;  
            V  = [1- 𝑡𝑡1+𝑡𝑡 mM ] ;          
          mM  = [PM(δDM/δY)] and 1>mM>0 .        
 
We now want to define IλI. Here ,IλI = (λKAλLM – λKMλLA ) <0, because sector A  is more 
labour intensive relative to sector M (by assumption).  
 
Using equations (3.7), (3.8), (3.9), (3.10) and (3.4.1) we can obtain    
  
          𝑃𝑃
�𝑁𝑁
𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹
 = (1/B)B10                               (18.1) 
And   𝑃𝑃
�𝑁𝑁
𝐾𝐾�𝐹𝐹
 = (1/B)B11                               (18.2) 
So, from (18.1) it follows that 𝑃𝑃�H <0 when 𝑁𝑁�F >0 as, B<0,  B10>0. Again from (3.1) we find 
that 𝑅𝑅� <0 when 𝑁𝑁�F >0. These are summarized in the form of the following proposition. 
As, B<0,  B10>0 if [tPM*XM 1|𝜆𝜆|λKA(λLH – εe) >WLh/XH] and hence we can conclude that 𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹  
<0. 
Proposition 1:  An inflow of foreign health capital leads to: (i) a decrease in the price of the 
output of non-traded health sector if tPM*XM 1|𝜆𝜆|λKA(λLH – εe) >WLe/XH and λLH > εe; (ii) a 
decrease in the return to health capital.    
 
 Proof of Proposition 1:  The above proposition can be explained as follows. From 
equation (4.1) we find that an inflow of foreign health capital leads to an increase in the 
production of health sector, for given price, that is PH. It implies that the supply curve of 
the health sector will shift rightward. Again for given PH, and hence for given R and 
also for given aNH and aLH we find that an increase in NF causes an increase in XH. It 
leads to an increase in both of aLHXH and Le(XH) . Thus [Le(XH)-aLHXH] will decline if an 
increase in Le(XH) due to an expansion of the health care dominates over the rise in 
aLHXH due to the same reason , that is from equation (6) we can say, labour availability 
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to sectors A and M will fall. It creates a Rybczynski type effect, resulting in contraction of 
sector A and expansion of sector M. This is because A is more labour intensive relative 
to sector M. So we find an inflow of foreign health capital leads to an increase in XM. For 
given PH and for given t, an increase in XM implies a decrease in import, since I =DM – 
XM, which again implies a decrease in tariff revenue. So, other things remaining same, 
the national income at domestic prices falls, which leads to a decrease in the demand for 
commodity H and, therefore, creates a downward shift of demand curve. So, for given 
PH, a decrease in demand and an increase in supply create excess supply situation in 
health sector. It means that PH is no longer given. This excess supply creates downward 
pressure on health price, that is, a decrease in PH. From equations (3) and (3.1) it is very 
clear that the movement of R is only depends upon the movement of PH. Thus, we can 
argue that R will fall as a result of fall in PH. 
 
Inserting the values of B, B11 into equation (18.2), we get,     
 𝑃𝑃
�𝑁𝑁
𝐾𝐾�𝐹𝐹
  = 1
𝐵𝐵
 [-EHY(1/VY) (-tPM*XM 1|𝜆𝜆| -γλLA )]             (18.2.1)  
 
From (18.2.1) it follows that 𝑃𝑃�H <0, when, 𝐾𝐾�F >0. This leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2 :   An inflow of foreign capital leads to: (i) a decrease in the price of the output of  
non-traded health sector if [ EHPH +EHY(1/VY)B7 - 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁] <0 and 0)//( <− KALAKMLM λλλλ  ; 
(ii) a decrease in the return to health capital.   
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  An inflow of foreign capital creates a Rybczynski effect leading to 
an expansion of import- competing sector (M) and contraction of the exportable 
sector(A). This is because sector M is more capital intensive than sector A. For given PH, 
an increase in XM implies a decrease in import, which again implies a decrease in tariff 
revenue. So, the national income at domestic prices falls, which leads to a downward 
shift of demand curve for non-traded health commodity. Using (3.4.1) we can say that, 
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for given PH, an inflow of foreign capital leads to no change in XH. So, the supply curve 
of this sector will remain unaffected. However, PH will remain no longer given as a 
reduction in demand for health, with given supply, creates an excess supply in the 
health sector which causes downward pressure on price of the health sector, that is, a 
reduction in PH.  
 
3.2 Output effects of Trade Liberalization 
 
So far we have considered the impact of trade liberalization, in the form of foreign 
health capital inflow and also inflow of ‘usual’ foreign capital, on the rate of return on 
health capital and also on the price of the good of the health sector. An analysis remains 
incomplete if the impact of trade liberalization on the output levels of various sectors 
are not analyzed. Now we focus on the impact of inflow of foreign health capital as well 
as impact of inflow of ‘usual’ foreign capital on the output levels of the three sectors 
that we have considered in our study.         
  
First we consider the impact of inflow of foreign health capital on the output levels and 
for this we use equations (4.1), (15), (16), (18.1.1) and after simplifying we get [see 
appendix A.1]   
 𝑋𝑋
�𝑁𝑁
𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹
 = µ  +�𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁�
𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁
𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹
                    (4.1.1) 
𝑋𝑋�𝐴𝐴
𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹
 = 1|𝜆𝜆|[ B2 + B3 𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹]                    (15.1) 
 𝑋𝑋
�𝑀𝑀
𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹
 = 1|𝜆𝜆|[ B5 +B6 𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹]                    (16.1) 
 
From equation (4.1.1) we can say that first term on the right hand side of that equation, 
that is, µ is positive and hence creates a positive impact on XH due to an inflow of 
foreign health capital. We call it infrastructural development force due to inflow of 
foreign health capital. As  𝑃𝑃
�𝑁𝑁
𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹
  is negative and hence creates a negative impact on XH. We 
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call it price force. If we assume that price force dominates over infrastructural 
development force due to an inflow of foreign health capital it leads to a fall in XH. 
Similarly, we can argue that 𝑋𝑋
�𝐴𝐴
𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹
 > 0 and 𝑋𝑋
�𝑀𝑀
𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹
 < 0, if we assume that price force dominates 
over infrastructural development force due to an inflow of foreign health capital.  
 
We now consider the impact of ‘usual’ foreign capital on the sectoral output levels. As 
the algebra is similar to that of the earlier ones, we just state that 𝑋𝑋
�𝑖𝑖
𝐾𝐾�𝐹𝐹
 is less than zero 
when i = M, H and greater than zero when i = A, if we assume that price force 
dominates over infrastructural development force due to an inflow of foreign capital. 
 
Proposition 3: An inflow of foreign health capital (or, foreign capital) leads to contraction of the 
output level of both health care and the import sector if [-µλKA (λLH - εh )] <0 and (λLH – 
εh)
𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
σH > - λLHσH  on one hand, and an expansion of the export sector on the other hand if (λLH 
- εh ) 0>  and [(λLH – εh)𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
σH + λLHσH] >0.  
Proof of Proposition 3: See discussion above and also see the proof of propositions 1 
and 2. 
 
 
 
4.  Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow and Foreign Health Capital Inflow on Social 
wellbeing 
 
Using (12) and (13) we obtain9 [For details see Appendix 3.B] 
(1/UA)(dU/dNF) = (Wh/L)(dXH/dNF) – NF(dR/dNF) + tPM*(dI/dNF)              
(3.19.2) 
9 For detailed derivation of (dI/dNF) see equation (3.10.1.B) of appendix 3.B. 
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 where, (dR/dNF) <0 and the sign of (dI/dNF) may be either positive or negative10. An 
inflow of foreign health capital with full repatriation of its earnings produces two 
effects on welfare. First, an inflow of foreign health capital leads to a decrease in the rate 
of return to health capital, since return to health capital and price of health good has a 
positive relationship between them. A decrease in return to health capital implies less 
repatriation of foreign capital, which improves social welfare. We call it factor price 
effect due to repatriation. Secondly, an inflow of foreign health capital may lead to a 
decline or an increase in import. This is because, an increase in foreign health capital 
leads to a decrease in price of health commodity as there is an exogenous increase in 
supply of health commodity, given PH. This increase in supply leads to a fall in price of 
health commodity. Fall in price of health sector implies a decrease in demand for the 
goods of the import sector due to positive cross price effects. Again fall in PH leads to a 
fall in R and hence a decline in national income, which creates a downward pressure on 
demand for import goods. Similarly, an increase in NF leads to a decrease in XM11. If fall 
in DM dominates over fall in XM, we get a decline in imports. Thus reduction in imports 
reduces tariff revenue and hence reduces social welfare. We call it negative tariff 
revenue effect. On the other hand we can get an increase in imports if fall in XM 
dominates over fall in DM and hence we get a positive tariff revenue effect. The net 
result of factor price effect due to repatriation and negative tariff revenue effect may be 
positive if former dominates over the latter otherwise it will be negative, that is, social 
welfare may fall due to an increase in foreign health capital. On the other hand if we 
consider the factor price effect and positive tariff revenue effect then the net result of 
these forces may creates a positive impact on social welfare. Here, dI/dNF >0 if we 
10 Detailed derivation of (dI/dNF) has been shown in equation (10.1.A) in appendix A.3. Using equation 
(18.1) we can obtain, dR/dNF = (1/aNH)( dPH/dNF) <o. 
 
11 Here (dXM/dNF) <0 , because we assume that price force dominates over infrastructural development 
force. It is to be noted that in equation (18), 𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁also includes 𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹 . 
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assume that the fall in XM dominates over fall in DM, we call it positive tariff revenue 
effect. Consideration of positive tariff revenue effect and factor price effect due to 
repatriation creates a positive effect on welfare whereas fall in h/ due to fall in XH leads 
to a fall in social welfare. This can be referred to as the nutritional efficiency effect. If the 
combined effect of positive tariff revenue effect and factor price effect due to 
repatriation on welfare dominates over the negative nutritional efficiency effect on 
welfare, then national welfare definitely improves. In particular, if we have a situation 
of full liberalization so that the tariff rate is zero then welfare definitely improves. Thus 
the following proposition can now be established.   
(1/UA)(dU/dKF) = (Wh/L)(dXH/dKF) – NF(dR/dKF) + tPM*(dI/dKF)             
(19.3) 
 
Similarly welfare can improve as positive effects on welfare due to an inflow of foreign 
capital dominates over negative effect on welfare due to inflow of foreign capital.  
 
Proposition 4:  In the presence of nutritional efficiency factor, an inflow of foreign health 
capital as well as an inflow of foreign capital, with full repatriation of their earnings, improves 
social welfare under some reasonable conditions. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: See the above discussion. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper attempts to infer the impact of infinitesimal changes of trade policies on the 
volume of a non-traded health care of a developing economy. In this article we have 
developed a hybrid type of three sector general equilibrium trade model, where first 
two sectors (export sector and import sector of our small open economy) form a 
Heckscher-Ohlin nugget and the third one is a non-traded health service producing 
sector. From such type of a set up we have shown that an inflow of foreign health 
17 
 
capital (or, usual foreign Capital) leads to contraction of both import and non-traded 
health sectors and expansion of the export sector even in the presence of nutritional 
efficiency factor of health care. Apart from output aspect in this study, we have also 
examined the gains from trade aspect of infinitesimal changes of trade policies and we 
have shown that in the trade liberalization in the form of foreign health capital ( or, 
Usual foreign capital) inflow is welfare improving when consumption efficiency 
hypothesis has been satisfied  and social welfare of our stylized economy will definitely 
improve in the absence of tariff.  
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Appendix A.  Detailed derivations of different expressions of the model 
 
Differentiation of equation (3.6.2) gives us 
λLA𝑋𝑋�A + λLM𝑋𝑋�M = -(µλLH - µεh)𝑁𝑁�F – [(λLH - εh)𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
 σH - (𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
σH)] 𝑃𝑃�H 
λLA𝑋𝑋�A + λLM𝑋𝑋�M = - [(λLH - εh) µ𝑁𝑁�F + Q𝑃𝑃�H]                                                                          
(3.6.2.1) 
Using (3.5.1) and (3.6.2.1) we can obtain 
 �𝜆𝜆𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴 𝜆𝜆𝐾𝐾𝑀𝑀
𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀
� �𝑋𝑋
�𝐴𝐴
𝑋𝑋�𝑀𝑀
� = � 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾
�𝐹𝐹
−[(λLH  −  εh) µ𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹  +  Q𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁]� 
 
Solving the above by Cramer’s rule and simplifying we can get 
𝑋𝑋�A = 1|𝜆𝜆| [(γλLM)𝐾𝐾�F + {µλKM (λLH – εh)}𝑁𝑁�F + (λKMQ)𝑃𝑃�H 
      = 1|𝜆𝜆| [B1𝐾𝐾�F + B2𝑁𝑁�F + B3𝑃𝑃�H ] 
𝑋𝑋�M = 1|𝜆𝜆| [(-γλLA)𝐾𝐾�F + {-µλKA (λLH – εh)}𝑁𝑁� F + (-λKAQ)𝑃𝑃�H ] 
      = 1|𝜆𝜆| [B4𝐾𝐾�F + B5𝑁𝑁�F + B5𝑃𝑃�H ] 
 
Using equation (3.10) and differentiating (3.11.3) 
𝑌𝑌� =( 1
𝑉𝑉𝑌𝑌
)[{WLh/XH𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
σH + RND/θNH +tPM*PH(δDM/δPH) –tPM*XM 1|𝜆𝜆|B6}𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁 +{-
tPM*XM 1|𝜆𝜆|B4}𝐾𝐾�𝐹𝐹                   +{ WLh/XHµ - tPM*XM 1|𝜆𝜆|A5}𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹]     
    
𝑌𝑌� = ( 1
𝑉𝑉𝑌𝑌
)[B7𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁+B8𝐾𝐾�𝐹𝐹+B9𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹]            (3.11.2.B) 
 
So, by using 𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹 =  𝐾𝐾�𝐹𝐹 = 0 we have  
𝑌𝑌�
𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁
 = ( 1
𝑉𝑉𝑌𝑌
) B7        (3.11.3.B) 
 
Using (3.11.2.B) in equation (3.A.5) we get 
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 𝐷𝐷
�𝑁𝑁
𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁
 = EHPH+ EHY( 1
𝑉𝑉𝑌𝑌
) B7    (3.7.3) 
 
From equation (3.4.1) we get, when  𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹 =  𝐾𝐾�𝐹𝐹  = 0   
 𝑋𝑋
�𝑁𝑁
𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁
 = (θLH σH/θNH)    (3.4.2) 
 
Substituting the expressions for 𝐷𝐷
�𝑁𝑁
𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁
 and  𝑋𝑋
�𝑁𝑁
𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁
 from (3.7.3) and (3.4.2) into (3.A.4) one 
obtains 
[EHPH+ EHY( 1
𝑉𝑉𝑌𝑌
) B7 - (θLH σH/θNH) ] < 0   
Or B = [EHPH+ EHY( 1
𝑉𝑉𝑌𝑌
) A7 - (θLH σH/θNH) ] < 0           (3.B.4.1) 
 
Differentiating (3.8), and simplifying we get  
EHPH𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁 + EHY𝑌𝑌� =  µ𝑁𝑁�F + (θLH σH/θNH) 𝑃𝑃�H   
EHPH𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁 + EHY [(
1
𝑉𝑉𝑌𝑌
){B7𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁+B8𝐾𝐾�𝐹𝐹+B9𝑁𝑁�𝐹𝐹}] = µ𝑁𝑁�F + (θLH σH/θNH) 𝑃𝑃�H   
[EHPH+ EHY( 1
𝑉𝑉𝑌𝑌
) B7 - (θLH σH/θNH) ] 𝑃𝑃�H = B10 ?̂?𝑁F+ B11 ?̂?𝑁F  
?̂?𝑁H= (B10/B) ?̂?𝑁F+ (B11/B) ?̂?𝑁F             (3.17.B) 
 
By differentiating production functions and using (3.4), (3.5) and (3.7), we get    
[dXA + PMdXM + PHdXH – rdKF – RdNF – NFdR] + XHdPH      
= (FLAdLA + FKAdKA) + PM (FLMdLM + FKMdKM) + PH (FLHdLH + FNHdNH) – rdKF – RdNF 
– NFdR + XHdPH  
=( Wh/L)dXH - NFdR + N dR        
 (3.B.6)  
Here, [dXA + PMdXM + PHdXH – rdKF – RdNF – NFdR]   
= ( Wh/L)dXH - NFdR                                                                                                             
(3.B.7) 
 
Using (3.B.6) in equation (3.11.1.A) we get   
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dY = ( Wh/L)dXH  + NDdR + tPM*dI  (3.11.B) 
 
Differentiating equation (3.10), simplifying and using (3.11.B) we get   
dI = (δDM/δPH) dPH + (δDM/δY) dY - dXM 
dI = (1/V) [ (δDM/δPH) + (mMND/PM aNH)]dPH + (1/V) [mMWh/L/PM]dXH – (1/V) dXM     
(3.10.2) 
 
Here, dI/dNF = (1/V)[(δDM/δPH) + (mMND/PMaNH)](dPH/dNF) – (1/v)dXM/dNF + 
(1/V)[mM/PM(Wh/L)](dXH/dNF)              (3.10.1.B) 
 
By using the above expression and (3.10.2) from (3.13.2) we can get 
(1/UA)dU = ( Wh/L)dXH  - NFdR + tPM*dI (3.19.B) 
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